Notes Toward a Theory of Multilevel Governing in Europe by Scharpf, Fritz W.
Notes Toward a Theory
of Multilevel Governing in Europe
Fritz W. Scharpf
00/5
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung
Paulstrasse 3
50676 Köln
Germany
Telephone 0221/2767 -0
Fax 0221/2767-555 MPIfG Discussion Paper 00/5
E-Mail info@mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de ISSN 0944–2073
Home Page http:/ /www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de November 2000
2 MPIfG Discussion Paper 00/5
Abstract
The complexity of the multi-level European polity is not adequately represented
by the single-level theoretical concepts of competing “intergovernmentalist” and
“supranationalist” approaches. By contrast, empirical research focusing on mul-
tilevel interactions tends either to emphasize the uniqueness of its objects, or to
create novel concepts – which are likely to remain contested even among Euro-
peanists and have the effect of isolating European studies from the political-
science mainstream in International Relations and Comparative Politics. These
difficulties are bound to continue as long as researchers keep proposing holistic
concepts that claim to represent the complex reality of the European polity as a
whole. It is suggested that the present competition among poorly fitting and
contested generalizations could be overcome if European studies made use of a
plurality of simpler and complementary concepts, each of which is meant to rep-
resent the specific characteristics of certain subsets of multi-level interactions –
which could also be applied and tested in other fields of political-science re-
search. The paper goes on to describe four distinct modes of multi-level interac-
tion in the European polity – “mutual adjustment”, “intergovernmental negotia-
tions”, “joint-decision making”, and “hierarchical direction” – and to discuss
their characteristics by reference to the criteria of problem-solving capacity and
institutional legitimacy.
Zusammenfassung
Die Komplexität der europäischen Mehrebenpolitik kann durch die auf Einebenen-
Interaktionen zugeschnittenenen „intergouvernementalen“ oder „supranationa-
len“ Ansätze nicht adäquat repräsentiert werden. Die empirische Forschung be-
tont deshalb entweder die Einzigartigkeit ihres Gegenstandes oder sie erfindet
neuartige Begriffe, die jedoch selbst in der Europaforschung umstritten bleiben
und diese überdies von der theoretischen Diskussion in den Internationalen Be-
ziehungen und der Vergleichenden Politikforschung isolieren. Diese Schwierig-
keiten werden fortdauern, solange man versucht, die komplexe Realität der eu-
ropäischen Politik jeweils im Ganzen durch holistische Begriffe zu erfassen. Die
unergiebigige Konkurrenz zwischen umstrittenen Generalkonzepten könnte je-
doch durch eine Mehrheit einfacherer und komplementärer Begriffe überwun-
den werden, die jeweils bestimmte Typen von Mehrebenen-Interaktionen be-
zeichnen – und die deshalb auch außerhalb der Europaforschung angewandt
und überprüft werden können. Der vorliegende Vortragstext beschreibt vier sol-
cher Typen – wechselseitige Anpassung, intergouvernementale Verhandlungen,
Politikverflechtung und hierarchische Steuerung – und erörtert ihre charakteri-
stischen Eigenschaften mit Bezug auf die Kriterien der Problemlösungsfähigkeit
und der institutionellen Legitimität.
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1 Multilevel Europe – the Case for Multiple Concepts
The European Union and its member states have become a multilevel polity
whose characteristics are poorly understood in political discourses as well as in
academic controversies that are shaped by our conventional understanding of
national politics and international relations. In public debates, we typically find
unrealistic expectations – fears or hopes – of what European policy might
achieve, combined with ignorance of what is in fact achieved, and polemics
against the “democratic deficit” of the institutions and processes through which
European policy outcomes are being achieved. There is, in other words, no realis-
tic understanding of the extent and the limitations of both, the institutional ca-
pacity and the institutional legitimacy of the European polity.
That is no reason for condescension, however, since the state of affairs in aca-
demic political science is not much better. There are, it is true, many highly
knowledgeable and perceptive empirical accounts of European institutions and
policy processes, but when it comes to theoretical explanations and normative as-
sessments, we still find unresolved controversies between “neo-functionalist” and
“realist”, or “supranational” and “intergovernmental” approaches in the opening
chapters of every dissertation. One reason is that the conceptual tools with which
the political-science sub-disciplines of international relations and comparative
politics are approaching the study of European institutions are ill suited to deal
with multi-level interactions.
From the “intergovernmental” perspective of international relations theory,
which presumes that nation states are the only theoretically relevant actors, the
European Union appears as a – more highly institutionalized – specimen of the
genus “international organization”. Such organizations are created to serve the
purposes of their member states; and to the extent that they do so, their actions
are legitimated by the agreement of member governments. At the same time,
these actions are fully explained by the interests, relative bargaining powers and
bargaining strategies of these governments (Hoffmann 1966, 1982; Garrett 1992,
1995; Moravcsik 1998). In other words, the multi-level polity of the European
Union is conceptualized in a single-level model of intergovernmental interac-
tions.1
                                                  
This article is the enlarged version of a lecture presented on the occasion of receiving the
Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science on 30 September 2000 at Uppsala University.
1 Moravcsik’s (1993, 1998) “liberal intergovernmentalism”, it is true, also has a domes-
tic module attached in which the preferences of national governments are shaped by
the interests of major national producer groups which, however, are not assumed to
be actors in their own right on the European level.
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By contrast, students of comparative politics are led by their own disciplinary
bias to emphasize the “supranational” characteristics of the Union, and to analyze
its governing institutions as if it was, or ought to be, a polity resembling the mod-
els of democratic nation states. To be sure, these models differ greatly in their
normative and descriptive characteristics, emphasizing either accountability
through competitive or consensual party systems (Lijphart 1999), or the respon-
siveness of pluralist, corporatist or clientelist systems of interest intermediation
(Truman 1951; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979; LaPalombara 1964). In any case,
however, the focus is on the interactions between a single, autonomous and po-
tentially omnipotent government and its constituents. Hence normative studies
will focus on the relationship between European-level (“supranational”) actors
and constituents – emphasizing either the lack of democratic accountability (Gre-
ven 2000) or the existence (or feasibility) of institutional mechanisms facilitating
responsiveness to constituency interests (Abromeit 1998; Eichener 2000; Grande
2000), whereas empirical research will either focus on the salience of European
elections and the influence of the European Parliament, or on the channels of suc-
cessful lobbying at the European level, the representation of “diffuse“ interests,
the role of deliberative problem solving in European “comitology”, and the inclu-
siveness of European “policy networks” involving business associations, large
firms, environmental and consumer groups and other NGOs involved in proc-
esses of interest intermediation (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Pollack 1997; Joer-
ges and Neyer 1997; Joerges and Vos 1999; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999).
Admittedly, our knowledge of the structures, processes, and outcomes of Euro-
pean integration was often advanced by good research designed from either one
of these competing perspectives. But the continuing controversies between “in-
tergovernmental” and “supranational” perspectives suggest that these insights
had to be achieved in spite of the poor “goodness of fit” of their paradigmatic as-
sumptions. Thus the intergovernmental international-relations perspective must
be pushed to the limits of its plausibility when it is asked to explain constellations
where supranational actors are empowered to act against the manifest prefer-
ences of member governments; where member states are subject to increasingly
tight European constraints in the exercise of their own governing powers; where
interactions among their citizens and corporations are increasingly governed by
European law; and where the range of problems for which solutions are being
sought at the European level seems to increase continuously (Burley and Mattli
1993; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; S.
Schmidt 1998; Eichener 2000; Pollack 2000).
Similarly, however, the supranational perspective of comparative-politics theo-
ries cannot easily represent a European polity in which member states continue to
be endowed with a full range of governing powers; in which the limited compe-
tencies of supranational actors are derived from agreement among member
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states; in which European legislation depends primarily on the agreement of
member governments; and in which member states are in control of the actual
administration of European regulations (Moravcsik 1998). Nor are these difficul-
ties eliminated in studies approaching the European Union from a comparative-
federalism perspective (Scharpf 1988; Wessels 1990; Sbragia 1992, 1993; V.
Schmidt 1999; Nicolaidis and Howse, forthcoming). While this perspective does
suggest models that are able to represent the coexistence of, and the interaction
between, distinct levels of government, their goodness of fit is still quite poor if it
should be assumed that European-level government could be equated with the
institutional capacity and legitimacy of central governments in federal nation
states2 – and if that equation cannot be made, federal models also lose much of
their explanatory and predictive power. For opposite reasons, that is also true of
perspectives equating the European Union with models of “confederal govern-
ance” (Wallace 1982; Lister 1996).3
In the face of these paradigmatic difficulties, some of the best work on Europe is
either self-consciously a-theoretical or it attempts to structure research through a
variety of innovative concepts and metaphors characterizing the European polity
as a “condominio”, a “consortio”, a “fusion” of governing functions, a structure
of “network governance”, and the like (Schmitter 1996; Marks et al. 1996; Wessels
1997; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999). In general, such concepts do indeed take ac-
count of the multi-level nature of European institutions and governing processes,
but they also emphasize their uniqueness and thus have the effect of carving out
a separate and theoretically distinct domain of “European Community Studies”.
Even within this domain, however, it seems fair to say that many of these novel
conceptualizations seem to be fitting the cases at hand, but have not yet found
broad acceptance among fellow Europeanists (Branch and Øhrgaard 1999; Sand-
holtz and Stone Sweet 1999), let alone among political scientists who are inter-
ested in theoretical propositions of more general applicability.
                                                  
2 The distortion is most pronounced if the federalist perspective is defined by reference
to the “separation” model of the US constitution. But even if it is realized that Euro-
pean institutions are structurally similar to the German model of “joint-decision”
federalism (Scharpf 1988; Sbragia 1992, 1993), parallels are misleading. Though
European legislation – like most important national legislation in Germany – de-
pends on the agreement of member governments, the political characteristics of ver-
tical interactions differ fundamentally since the democratic legitimacy and the bar-
gaining resources of the national government and parliament in Germany are so
much greater than those of the European Commission and the European Parliament.
3 Lister acknowledges as much: “At the same time, the European Union, while clearly
falling within the broad class of confederations, differs in fundamental ways from
earlier confederal models. It has legislative, executive, judicial and financial capabili-
ties that they did not have and that allow its institutions to operate much more effec-
tively (Lister 1996: 107).
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That seems an unfortunate and unnecessary state of affairs. It is unfortunate be-
cause it tends to immunize European studies against theoretical criticism from
other quarters while depriving more general political-science theories of the em-
pirical challenges arising from the growing body of research focused on Europe.
It also seems unnecessary since, even if the European polity is sui generis in the
sense that there is no other institutional constellation quite like it, it should still be
possible to analyze its institutions and policy processes with the use of theory-
based concepts and propositions that are also useful in comparative politics and
international relations. From what I said so far, however, it also would follow that
the reintegration of European studies into the mainstream of political science
cannot be achieved through holistic concepts attempting to equate the European
Union to any of the reasonably well understood, but internally complex macro-
models or ideal types which political scientists use as a first cut in distinguishing
among political systems.
Certainly, the European Union is not a majoritarian or a consociational democ-
racy, but neither are its structures and processes of interest intermediation gener-
ally congruent with ideal types like pluralism, corporatism or even network gov-
ernance, nor do its intergovernmental structures and processes generally conform
to the legal models of federation, confederacy or international organization. In-
stead, I suggest, that we should work with a plurality of lower-level and simpler
concepts describing distinct governing modes in the European polity – which,
however, should also be useful as theoretical modules in studies of national gov-
ernment or international relations. The ones I will discuss here focus on the verti-
cal relationship between European and national levels of government. It is clear
that they could and should eventually be complemented by other lower-level
concepts focusing on structures and processes of interest intermediation and on
the political interactions between governmental actors at both levels and their
constituencies. In the present article, however, my focus will be on vertical inter-
actions among governments which I will describe – in the order of increasing su-
pranationalism – as the modes of “mutual adjustment”, “intergovernmental ne-
gotiations”, “joint decision making” and “hierarchical direction”.4
Moreover, I suggest that we should explain the progressive Europeanization of
governing functions by reference to theoretical propositions that are useful for
describing and explaining similar upward shifts of governing functions in federal
national states or, for that matter, similar processes of political unification in-
                                                  
4 These concepts correspond to the “modes of interaction” discussed in Scharpf
(1997a). The list is not complete, however, since the mode of “majority voting” does
not – and cannot (Lord 1998; Scharpf 1999) – play the same central legitimating role
in the European polity that we have come to associate with the majority rule in
democratic nation states.
Scharpf: Multilevel Governing in Europe 9
volving nation states.5 By the same token, I find it important that the institutional
capacity and legitimacy of Europeanized governing should be evaluated by refer-
ence to the same normative criteria that we generally use for the evaluation of
governing institutions.
2 What Drives Europeanization?
I begin with a brief discussion of the policy goals and pressures that account for
the progressive Europeanization of governing functions from the mid-1950s to
the present. Since NATO was by then taking care of European security interests6
– “keeping the Russians out and the Germans down” – the explicit motive driv-
ing European integration was economic – or, more precisely, the anticipated
benefits for consumers and producers that were thought to be associated with the
creation of larger European markets for goods and services, and capital (Moravc-
sik 1998).7
This quest for economies of scale has not only driven the geographic enlargement
from the Economic Community of the Six to the preset Union of the Fifteen and
beyond. It also explains the progress from a free-trade area to a customs union
and to a common market eliminating national non-tariff barriers to trade (Arm-
strong and Bulmer 1998). Moreover, being the only manifest European mission,
economic goals became progressively radicalized – moving from the mere inte-
gration of national markets as they existed in the “mixed economies” of member
states to an active extension and perfection of market competition. It thus became
a European governing function to eliminate national subsidies, public procure-
ment practices and the “privileges” of public enterprises, public utilities and
public services that could be construed as distortions of free market competition.
By the same logic, finally, it was thought that the transaction costs imposed by
the existence of multiple currencies and variable exchange rates ought to be
eliminated by the creation of a monetary union and a common currency (Verdun
1996, 2000; Moravcsik 1998: chapter 6).
                                                  
5 For an early and still convincing attempt to explain European integration through
concepts and propositions claiming general applicability to processes of “political
unification”, see Etzioni (1965).
6 Which otherwise would have provided very powerful motives for federation (Riker
1964).
7 This is not meant to deny the crucial role that European integration has played in
creating conditions where, for the first time in history, war among European coun-
tries has become unthinkable. As economic boundaries were being removed, moving
political boundaries between member states has ceased to be a salient national goal.
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Here I will not examine the theoretical validity of these propositions or the em-
pirical magnitude of the economic benefits that can in fact be attributed to the
achievements of market integration in Europe (Kamppeter 2000).8 What matters
much more, from a political-science perspective, are the secondary effects of this
process. As the primary goals of market integration are being realized, member
states find themselves exposed to political pressures of a kind which in federal
nation states (which had integrated national markets to begin with) have every-
where resulted in the progressive centralization of “market-correcting” governing
functions that affected profits and production costs and hence the competitive
position of subnational economic regions. Thus practically all federal states have
come to regulate the economically salient aspects of work safety, environmental
protection, labor law, industrial relations and the welfare state at the national
level.
In Europe, the same pressures are reflected in current debates about the erosion
of national governing capabilities in integrated European markets where firms
may offer their products throughout the Union; where consumers will select
goods and services without regard to their origin within the Union; and where
capital owners are free to invest, and firms free to locate their production, any-
where within the territory of the Union. Among the member states of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union, moreover, these locational choices are not even con-
strained by the risks of exchange-rate adjustments.
As a consequence, the impacts of national policies affecting aggregate or sectoral
demand, average or sectoral production costs and post-tax profits are no longer
limited to the national economy. There may be positive externalities, as when the
additional demand generated by a cut of income taxes will “spill out” to neigh-
boring countries, or when an increase of taxes on capital interest or profits will
trigger capital outflows into low-tax jurisdictions. By the same token, negative
externalities occur when a major reduction of employers’ social-security contri-
butions will increase the price competitiveness of national products at the ex-
pense of competitors in European product markets, or when similar effects are
achieved by union wage restraint or a deregulation of labor markets. It is likely,
moreover, that these economic externalities will have political repercussions – as
when German truck operators were blocking the streets of Berlin in response to
tax reductions on Diesel fuel in France and the Netherlands. To the extent that
                                                  
8 These economic benefits of integration may exist, but they are not easy to demon-
strate empirically: In the macro-economic crises of the 1970s, small European coun-
tries outside of the Common Market (e.g., Sweden, Austria, Switzerland) were doing
better than Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium; and just as the Single-Market
program was being completed in 1992, the member states of the Union were hit by
the deepest post-war recession (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000b).
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governments are aware of and respond to this European interdependence among
their policy choices, it is meaningful to say that the governing functions affected
are in fact becoming Europeanized.
3 Modes of Europeanization
It makes a great difference, however, whether Europeanization is merely the out-
come of strategic actions among governments that are aware of their mutual in-
terdependence – which I describe as the mode of “mutual adjustment” – or
whether Europeanized governing functions are exercised in one of the modes of
institutionalized interaction – where I distinguish among the modes of “intergov-
ernmental negotiations”, of “joint decisions” or of “hierarchical direction”. In
what follows, I will discuss the characteristics and consequences of these modes
by reference to two evaluative criteria, institutional capacity and institutional legiti-
macy, both of which need to be understood in a relational sense. The first is used
to evaluate the decision rules and incentive structures of Europeanized governing
modes in relation to the specific range of problems that are supposed to be re-
solved through Europeanization. Similarly, the second criterion should be used to
evaluate those Europeanized governing functions that are in fact effectively per-
formed in the light of legitimating arguments that are generally considered perti-
nent for the evaluation of governing institutions at the national level (Lord 1998).
Both of these criteria should and could be elaborated further (Scharpf 1999,
2000b), but I trust that their intended meaning will become sufficiently clear in
the following discussion.
3.1 Mutual Adjustment
The default mode of Europeanized policy responses to increasing economic in-
terdependence is “mutual adjustment”. Here, national governments continue to
adopt their own policies nationally, but they do so in response to, or anticipation
of, the policy choices of other governments. Hence these strategic interactions
among governments can be analyzed as a non-cooperative game.9 In theory and
in the real world, there is of course a great variety of possible game constellations.
                                                  
9 As I have pointed out elsewhere, even constellations where governments merely ad-
just their own policies to economic conditions affected by the interdependent policy
choices of other governments, can usefully be analyzed as a non-cooperative game
(Scharpf 1997a: 107–112).
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In some of them, the expected outcomes (or equilibria) of strategic interaction are
mutually beneficial (Genschel 1997), in others they will benefit some parties at the
expense of others, and in still others all parties may be worse off (Rapoport and
Guyer 1966; Rapoport, Guyer and Gordon 1976; Scharpf 1997b). By the same to-
ken, there also cannot be a general verdict on the problem-solving effectiveness of
mutual adjustment in Europe.
Economists who are impressed with the benefits of market competition, it is true,
would generally ascribe beneficial efficiency effects not only to the competition
among political parties, but also to constellations in which mutual adjustment
forces national governments to engage in forms of “systems competition” (i.e. tax
competition and regulatory competition) against each other (S. Sinn 1993; Van-
berg and Kerber 1994). However, one should not ignore the important differences
between the competition among firms (which presumably benefits all consum-
ers), the competition among political parties (benefiting all voters) and the loca-
tional competition between territorial governments – which tends to benefit mo-
bile firms, investors and taxpayers at the expense of the less mobile members of
national constituencies, and which reduces the capacity of national governments
to perform those market-correcting functions which, in economic theory, justifies
the establishment of governments in the first place (H.-W. Sinn 1994; Scharpf
1998).
Moreover, economic theory tends to discount the effect on democratic self-deter-
mination if “systems competition” should prevent all governments from adopt-
ing policies that would reflect the preferences of their constituencies. For an ex-
ample, think of the situation in which the American states found themselves in
the early decades of the last century, when even “progressive” state governments
could not adopt legislation limiting the employment of children for fear of losing
market shares in interstate commerce.10 As the European internal market has ap-
proached completion, these same competitive pressures are now constraining
member states in taxation, in the regulation of employment relations, in social
policy, in the environmental regulation of production processes and in other
“market-correcting” policy choices (Scharpf 1999). These constraints may not only
reduce the problem-solving effectiveness of national polities, but they also affect
their institutional legitimacy by preventing the adoption of (otherwise feasible)
policies responding to the manifest demands of national electorates (Scharpf
2000b).
                                                  
10 In fact, child-labor legislation in the United Sates (along with other regulations of
employment conditions, social security and other welfare-state policies) had to wait
until the 1937 “New-Deal revolution” in American constitutional law which then al-
lowed the federal government to adopt uniform national regulations (Skocpol 1987).
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In response to these tightening constraints, member states have been trying to
move away from the mode of mutual adjustment, and to control systems compe-
tition through the coordination or centralization of governing functions at the
European level. Within the democratic nation state, however, politics at the na-
tional level tends to have the greatest political salience, and the clearest proce-
dures assuring democratic accountability. Hence a shift of market-correcting gov-
erning functions from the subnational to the national level is generally associated
not only with a gain in problem-solving capacity but also with a gain in demo-
cratic legitimacy. By contrast, neither of these effects are assured when competen-
cies are shifted from the national to the European level. In both regards, more-
over, there are significant differences between the three modes of institutional-
ized European governing functions that I am considering here.
3.2 Intergovernmental Negotiations
At the lowest level of institutionalization, Europeanized governing is realized in
the mode of “intergovernmental negotiations”. Here, national policies are coordi-
nated or standardized by agreements at the European level, but national govern-
ments remain in full control of the decision process, none of them can be bound
without its own consent, and the transformation of agreements into national law
and their implementation remains fully under their control. This is emphatically
true of policies requiring Treaty revisions that must be ratified in all member
states. Beyond that, the mode applies in the second and third pillars of “common
foreign and security policy” and of “police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters”, and it is also approximated in those policy areas in the first pillar where
the Council of Ministers must still decide by unanimity.
Since all participating governments have a veto, the legitimacy of policies so
adopted can be indirectly derived from the legitimacy of democratically account-
able national governments (Lord 1998).11 By the same token, however, the prob-
lem-solving capacity of negotiated policy is strictly limited to solutions which are
preferable to the status quo from the perspective of all participating governments.
If such solutions are not available, side payments and package deals may still fa-
cilitate agreement under favorable circumstances (Scharpf 1997a: chapter 6). More
generally, however, solutions will be blocked by major conflicts of interest –
which is exactly what governments seem to want in the second and third pillars,
where sovereignty issues are extremely salient.
                                                  
11 Strictly speaking, that is only true for the initial agreement. Once a common policy
has been adopted, it can only be changed by unanimous intergovernmental agree-
ment. Hence individual governments are no longer able to respond to new circum-
stances or changing constituency preferences (Scharpf 1988) .
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For the resolution of problems generated by regulatory and tax competition in the
integrated European economies, however, the mode of intergovernmental nego-
tiations seems to offer little promise in all constellations where existing national
solutions differ significantly from one another, or where some countries are actu-
ally benefiting from competition. If evidence were required, the unending history
of efforts to harmonize the taxation of capital interest or of corporate profits
through unanimous agreement should suffice. But how, then, did these same
governments manage to achieve the degree of market integration that is generat-
ing these competitive pressures?
3.3 Hierarchical Direction
In discussing this question, I now turn to “hierarchical direction”, the mode in
which competencies are completely centralized at the European level and exer-
cised by supranational actors without the participation of member-state govern-
ments. Within federal nation states, such centralized competencies are generally
exercised by majorities in national parliaments, cabinet ministers and prime min-
isters whose legitimacy is directly derived from electoral accountability. In the
European Union, by contrast, functions which are performed without the partici-
pation of member governments are also removed from the influence of demo-
cratically accountable political actors. They are exercised by the European Central
Bank, by the European Court of Justice and by the European Commission when it
is acting as a guardian of the Treaty in infringement procedures against national
governments.
Since these functions are exercised without the participation of either the Euro-
pean Parliament or of member-state governments, their legitimacy must depend
entirely on shared beliefs in the authority of the law and in the capacity of profes-
sional authorities to realize shared norms, values or goals (Majone 1989, 1996).
For the ECB, these goals were explicitly and quite narrowly defined as a com-
mitment to price stability in the Maastricht Treaty (now Article 105 of the EC
Treaty), whereas the independent governing powers of the Court and the Com-
mission are derived from their implicit responsibility for interpreting the law of
the Treaty in the process of applying it in specific legal proceedings.
Non-democratic legitimacy also plays a role in democratic nation states where
constitutional courts, independent central banks or independent regulatory agen-
cies are performing governing functions for which they are thought to be better
suited than politically accountable governments. At the national level, however,
this form of legitimacy is inherently precarious and would collapse if non-
accountable actors should exceed the limits of the “permissive consensus” on
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which their governing powers depend (Bickel 1962) – in which case the policy
choices of independent actors, or even their institutional independence, would
become vulnerable to correction by legislative action or constitutional amend-
ment.12 In the European Union, by contrast, such reversals would be much more
difficult to achieve. The independence of the European Central Bank is protected
by the Maastricht Treaty to a degree that exceeds the institutional autonomy of
any national central bank (Elgie 1998; Haan and Eijffinger 2000), while Treaty-
based decisions of the European Court of Justice could only be reversed by Treaty
revisions that must be ratified by all member states. Moreover, the ECJ has been
able to establish the doctrines of “direct effect” and “supremacy” by which its
interpretations of European law will override not only acts of government, but
also parliamentary legislation and even the constitutions of all member states
(Weiler 1982).
In terms of substantive policy, the supranational governing functions exercised
by the Court and the Commission have been most effective in policy areas where
economic integration could be advanced by applying fairly explicit prohibitions
in the treaties against national policies constituting barriers to the free mobility of
goods, services, capital and persons or distortions of free competition. In inter-
preting these rules of “negative integration”, the Commission and the Court have
certainly gone beyond the original intent of negotiating parties at the conferences
of Messina and Rome (Scharpf 1999: 54–62). Nevertheless, governments have by
and large continued to support the moving goal of ever increasing economic in-
tegration (Moravcsik 1998), even though the Amsterdam Summit attempted to
impose some limits on the reach of European competition law which, however,
have not been very effective.
So how should we judge the problem-solving effectiveness and legitimacy of
those governing functions whose exercise has been centralized? As for effective-
ness in achieving their assigned or self-chosen goals, the record of hierarchical
policy choices adopted by the Commission and the Court is indeed impressive:
National courts have generally accepted the authority of the European Court of
Justice as the ultimate interpreter of European law (Burley and Mattli 1993), and
even the German constitutional court has finally abjured its claim to act as a court
of last resort when individual liberties are in issue.13 As a consequence, European
law is routinely enforced in ordinary cases and controversies by the judicial sys-
tems of member states. Moreover, this law goes further in eliminating non-tariff
                                                  
12 The historical cause celèbre is President Rooseveldt’s “court packing plan” of 1937,
which caused the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse its line of anti-New-Deal decisions.
It should also be noted that the much celebrated independence of the German Bun-
desbank was never protected against ordinary legislation.
13 Bundesverfassungsgericht 2 BvL 1/97, June 6, 2000.
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barriers to free trade and free movement than is true in long-established federal
states like the United States, Australia or Switzerland. Even more significant is
the fact that European competition law is effective in imposing much narrower
restrictions on public subsidies granted by member states than federal states are
imposing on subnational governments (Zürn 2000; Wolf 2000), and that it also is
enforcing competition in public services and public utilities which, within nation
states, had everywhere been exempted from anti-trust and competition law
(Scharpf 1999: chapters 2 and 3).
In short, if there should be reason for concern, it is not about the lack of effective-
ness of negative integration, but rather about the single-minded perfectionism
with which the ideal of perfectly competitive markets is pursued by the Commis-
sion and the Court.14 Much the same could be said for the effectiveness of the
European Central Bank in assuring price stability among EMU member states. In
spite of the recent decline of the Euro exchange rate (whose maintenance is not an
explicit goal assigned to the ECB), its internal value has remained remarkably
stable in comparison to earlier decades, and even in Germany the near-hysterical
fears of trading the stable Mark against an inflationary Euro seem to have abated.
If the problem-solving effectiveness of European monetary policy is at all ques-
tioned, doubts are primarily voiced in quarters where (contrary to the explicit lan-
guage of the Treaty) price stability is not considered the only criterion of success.
But what of the legitimacy of centralized European governing functions? Here it
is remarkable that concerns about a European democratic deficit have rarely been
addressed to those policy areas where Commission and Court were advancing
negative integration without the participation of either national governments or
the European Parliament. Since these policies are carried out in the form of legal
actions, they are by and large accepted with the affirmative support or the grum-
bling respect15 with which winners and losers tend to respond to court decisions
at the national level. In other words, market-making supranational policies bene-
fited not only from the ascendancy of neo-liberal and free-trade doctrines in aca-
deme and in the media, but also from the customary respect for “the Law” and
                                                  
14 That is certainly the view of the German Länder which, in the run-up to the Nice
Summit, even threatened to block Eastern enlargement in the absence of Treaty
amendments protecting their infrastructure functions against European competition
policy.
15 That may be about to change as the discretionary character of extensive interpreta-
tions of European competition law, and their lack of political legitimation, are pub-
licly asserted by (sub)national political actors in cases where interventions by the
Commission are clashing with politically salient (sub)national industrial, infrastruc-
ture and cultural policies. In Germany, these clashes give rise to double-pronged
demands for institutional reforms increasing the democratic accountability of the
Commission and limiting the scope of its competencies.
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from the legitimacy credit granted to judicial interpretations in the constitutional
democracies of member states.
That is not, or perhaps not yet, generally true of monetary policy and the Euro-
pean Central Bank – mainly because member states differed greatly in the extent
to which monetary and currency-policy choices had been de-politicized before
the creation of the Monetary Union. In countries like Germany, where central
bank independence has a long tradition, the worry was that the ECB would be
less independent than the Bundesbank, whereas in Britain, Sweden, Denmark and
some other member states, the critical issue was precisely the lack of political ac-
countability (Elgie 1998). It seems, however, that the accountability issue is also
raised as a proxy for serious concerns about the problem-solving effectiveness of
the Monetary Union (Gustavsson 2000). These must be particularly salient in
countries that used to rely on devaluation for solving major economic and em-
ployment problems. By contrast, the present member states had been part of the
European Monetary System before joining the European Monetary Union, and
they had learned to live with the constraints of a non-accommodating monetary
policy and nearly-fixed exchange rates. For them, therefore, the change from a
tight-money policy defined by the Bundesbank with a view to conditions in the
German economy to a tight-money policy defined by the ECB with a view to aver-
age conditions in Euroland, must seem more a promise than a threat.16
The implication is that for the most centralized and “supranational” governing
mode of the multilevel European polity neither problem-solving effectiveness nor
                                                  
16 A potentially more serious challenge to the problem-solving effectiveness of ECB
monetary policy arises from the fact that the Monetary Union is not an “optimal cur-
rency area”, and that economic conditions, and phases of the business cycle may sig-
nificantly differ among member states. Since the ECB can only respond to average
conditions, its actual policy may turn out to be either too tight or too loose for the
economies of particular member states. The latter problem is currently faced by Ire-
land, where inflation runs twice as high as the Euro average – with the consequence
that uniform nominal Euro interest rates will translate into negative real interest rates
for consumers and investors in Ireland. Under these conditions, it is at least uncertain
if union wage restraint can be relied upon to dampen the inflationary pressures that
are exacerbated by the misfit of European monetary policy (Hardiman 2000).
Since the economic consequences of a lack of fit between uniform ECB policy and di-
verse conditions of national economies must be dealt with by national policy re-
sponses, the tightness of the budgetary constraints laid down by the Maastricht
Treaty and the subsequent Stability Pact may also interfere with effective problem
solving. However, as the Scandinavian countries seem to have been quickest to
grasp, there is a functionally equivalent solution to deficit spending: Finland, Sweden
and Denmark have built up substantial budget surpluses, which should allow them
to respond with vigorous fiscal expansion to future economic downturns without
violating any of the EMU constraints.
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legitimacy are seriously in question. But in comparison to the full range of public
policies that are in place at the national level in advanced capitalist democracies,
the reach of the supranational mode is essentially restricted to the “market-
making” enforcement of “negative integration” by the Commission and the Court
and to control over the currency by the European Central Bank. It was not, and
could not be used to achieve market-correcting “positive integration” by non-
political hierarchical fiat.17 Instead, policies that might be effective in dealing with
the negative consequences of regulatory and tax competition depend on “politi-
cal” regulations, directives and decisions that can only be adopted with the par-
ticipation of member governments.
3.4 Joint Decisions
The “joint-decision mode” combines aspects of intergovernmental negotiations
and supranational centralization. It applies in most policy areas of the “first pil-
lar” that includes the market-making as well as the market-correcting competen-
cies of the European Community. Here, European legislation generally depends
on initiatives of the Commission which must be adopted (unanimously or by
qualified majority) by the Council of Ministers and, increasingly, by the European
Parliament. Assessments of the institutional capacity and legitimacy of this mode
vary considerably in the academic literature and in political debates – which re-
flects the fact that policy choices depend, at the same time, on the institutional re-
sources and strategies of supranational actors, and on the convergence of prefer-
ences among national governments – both of which are likely to vary from one
policy area to another.
If member governments are united in their opposition to Commission initiatives,
or if highly salient national interests are strongly divergent, European solutions
will be blocked, regardless of the involvement of Commission and Parliament.
The role of supranational actors will be significant, however, in constellations
where national interests diverge but are not highly salient or – more important in
theory and practice – in constellations where member governments disagree over
the substance of a European policy, but still would prefer a common solution
over the status quo.
Under these conditions – which can be analytically represented by a Battle-of-the-
Sexes game – common solutions could still be blocked by intergovernmental hag-
gling over the precise content of European rules. It is here, therefore, that quali-
                                                  
17 Exceptions are policies promoting gender equality in employment and preventing
discrimination against migrant workers, both of which can be directly derived from
the Treaty.
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fied majority voting should be most acceptable to governments. By the same to-
ken, it is here that the capacity for European action will benefit most from the
Commission’s agenda-setting monopoly, from the expanding co-decision rights
of the Parliament (Tsebelis 1994), from the good services of national representa-
tives in COREPER (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Lewis 2000) and from the
work of “Europeanized” national experts in the hundreds of committees prepar-
ing, or specifying the details of, Council directives (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Joer-
ges and Vos 1999).
By the same token, however, the institutional legitimacy of joint-decision proce-
dures looses its “intergovernmental” foundation. By the logic of the original trea-
ties, European legislation was primarily legitimated by the agreement of demo-
cratically accountable national governments. Yet these legitimating arguments
are undermined the more the role of non-accountable “supranational” actors and
procedures are emphasized in the literature and perceived by political actors and
their publics. If it is true that infringement proceedings initiated by the Commis-
sion can compel national governments to change their positions on politically sa-
lient issues (S. Schmidt 1998), that national representatives in COREPER will con-
spire to block domestic opposition to European compromises (Lewis 2000), and
that “comitology” favors agreements among national experts that are de-coupled
from the positions of their governments (Joerges and Neyer 1997), then the formal
agreement of a majority of governments in the Council will no longer have much
legitimating force.
As a consequence, the focus of legitimating arguments in the literature has
shifted. What is now emphasized is the openness of European decision processes
to the demands and the expertise of plural interests, the flexibility of European
“networks” of interest intermediation, and the “deliberative” qualities of interac-
tions in comitology (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996; Kohler-Koch and Eising
1999; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996; Marks and McAdam 1996; Joerges and Vos
1999; Schmalz-Bruns 1999). Regardless of the descriptive accuracy of these ac-
counts, however, their normative persuasiveness must rest on the proposition
that the accommodation of special interests and the substantive quality of Euro-
pean standards could be a legitimating substitute for democratic accountability
based on general and equal elections and public debates. But since effectiveness
of European policy must frequently be achieved by “subterfuge” in processes that
are completely intransparent to the public (Héritier 1999), there is no assurance
that all affected interests will even be aware of what is going on at the European
level.18 For politically salient issues, at any rate, it is hard to see how informal
                                                  
18 Similar claims to legitimacy were advanced by theorists of American pluralism
(Truman 1951; Latham 1952), but it is fair to say that they were ultimately rejected on
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networks of interest intermediation and anonymous expert committees could be
considered satisfactory substitutes for the democratic accountability of represen-
tatives whose mandate is derived, directly or indirectly, from general elections
based on the formal equality of all citizens (Greven 2000; Weiler 1999).
In light of these legitimacy problems, it is perhaps good news that the success sto-
ries celebrating the effectiveness of supranational mechanisms and the problem-
solving capacity of European policy (Pollack 1997; Eichener 1997, 2000) are con-
siderably exaggerated or at least over-generalized. They are true as far as they go,
but their empirical domain is limited to a range of policy areas in which conflict
over divergent national interests is overshadowed by a common interest, or
where decisions tend to have low political salience for the general public. This is
true for “market-making” directives harmonizing national product regulations19
and for a few other policy areas where common interests are stronger than diver-
gent interests (Scharpf 1997a, 1999). But where it is not true, national govern-
ments remain fully capable of blocking European decisions even if the decision
rule is qualified-majority voting in the Council (Golub 1996a, 1996b).
From a legitimacy point of view, therefore, all seems to be well: In the joint-
decision mode, the Union can deal only with problems where European action is
supported by a broad consensus involving democratically accountable national
governments, a directly elected European Parliament and those affected (and or-
ganized) interests that are able to influence the agenda-setting functions of the
Commission. Where this consensus exists, the legitimacy of policies so adopted is
not seriously in question, even though the procedures do not conform to standard
models of democratic accountability in the nation state. Where it does not exist,
European action is blocked, and problems are left to be resolved by national gov-
ernments in institutions and procedures with presumably impeccable democratic
credentials. But all is not well from a problem-solving perspective if the market-
making policies on which Europe can agree will damage the capacity of national
governments to adopt those “market correcting” policies on which the Union
cannot agree. Unfortunately, this European problem-solving gap tends to exist in
precisely those policy areas where national governing functions are most vulner-
able to systems competition.
                                                                                                                                                 
empirical as well as normative grounds (Mills 1956; Dahl 1961, 1967; Bachrach and
Baratz 1963; Olson 1965; McConnell 1966; Lindblom 1977).
19 When that is not true – as in the BSE case or for genetically modified foodstuffs –
national governments tend to take control again, since it is they, rather than the
anonymous experts on the Commission’s Veterinary Committee, who must face the
brunt of political protest at home.
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One reason is that constellations of tax competition and regulatory competition
do not generally resemble either a Battle-of-the-Sexes game or a symmetrical Pris-
oner’s Dilemma – in which case agreement on common rules regulating competi-
tion should be possible. In tax competition, for instance, small countries may ac-
tually increase their revenue through tax cuts which bigger countries could not
reciprocate without incurring massive revenue losses (Dehejia and Genschel
1999). Similar asymmetries may favor competitive deregulation in other policy
areas. In such constellations, the winners are clearly not interested in having their
competitive advantages harmonized away by common European rules. But even
in the absence of winner-loser asymmetries, harmonization may be blocked by
conflicts arising from politically salient differences among member states in eco-
nomic development, policy legacies, institutional structures or ideological prefer-
ences.
Thus, environmental regulations considered necessary in Denmark, Germany or
the Netherlands may simply not be affordable in less rich member states like
Greece, Spain or Portugal, let alone countries on the threshold of Eastern en-
largement. The same would be true if the Union attempted to standardize the
provision of social transfers and of public social services at the level that is con-
sidered appropriate in the Scandinavian countries. If that were all, it might per-
haps be possible to agree on relative standards reflecting these differences in the
ability-to-pay of member states at different stages of economic development. Yet
even though Britain and Sweden may be similarly wealthy, they could still not
agree on common European welfare-state solutions.
The reason is that European welfare states have come to define widely differing
dividing lines between the functions the state is expected to perform and those
that are left to private provision, either in the family or by the market. They all
provide social assistance to the needy, but in Scandinavia and on the European
continent, the state also provides earnings-related social insurance that is meant
to secure the standard of living of average-income families in the case of unem-
ployment, sickness, disability and in old age. In Britain and other Anglo-Saxon
welfare states, by contrast, workers with average or higher incomes have learned
to rely on private provisions for these eventualities. Moreover, only the Scandi-
navian welfare states are providing universal and high-quality social services
freeing wives and mothers from family duties while at the same time providing
the public-sector jobs that have raised female participation in the labor market to
record levels. In Continental and Anglo-Saxon countries, by contrast, these serv-
ices are left to be provided in the family or by the market (Scharpf and Schmidt
2000a). Differences of similar significance are also characteristic of the industrial-
relations institutions of EU member states (Crouch 1993; Ebbinghaus and Visser
2000).
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These structural differences are not merely of a technical nature but have high
political salience. They correspond to fundamentally differing welfare-state aspi-
rations which can be roughly equated with the historical dominance of “liberal”,
“christian democratic” and “social democratic” political parties and social theo-
ries (Esping-Andersen 1990). Moreover, and perhaps more important: Citizens in
all countries have come to base their life plans on the continuation of existing
models, and any attempts to replace these with qualitatively different European
solutions would mobilize fierce opposition. Scandinavian voters would resist the
dismantling of their full-service welfare state just as much as British voters would
refuse to accept the higher taxes that would be needed to finance the Scandina-
vian model, and both would reject the German model of tightly regulated indus-
trial relations and co-determination. There is, in short, no single “European social
model” on which harmonization could converge (Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes
2000).
In the joint-decision mode, therefore, national governments, accountable to their
national constituencies, could not possibly agree on the common European solu-
tions for the core functions of the welfare state. That need not prevent the adop-
tion of minimum European standards on social and workers’ rights either
through Council directives or through agreements reached in the “Social Dia-
logue” of the peak-level organizations of capital and labor (Leibfried and Pierson
1995; Falkner 1998). But since such standards must be acceptable to all member
states, they must not only be economically viable in the least wealthy member
states, but also compatible with all existing industrial-relations and welfare-state
institutions. It is no surprise, therefore that only very undemanding regulations
have been able to pass this dual test (Streeck 1995, 1997) – which also implies that
while they may be useful in raising minimal levels of social protection in Anglo-
Saxon and Southern countries, they will not do much to relieve the competitive
pressures on more advanced Continental and Scandinavian welfare states.
4 Other Options?
Under present conditions, therefore, European social policy is able to intervene
(in the mode of hierarchical direction) against discriminatory national rules and
practices affecting migrant workers and gender equality, and to adopt legislation
(in the joint-decision mode) assuring minimal standards of social protection that
do not challenge either the ability to pay or the core institutions of member states.
Nor could institutional reforms change much in this regard. Given the high po-
litical salience of national welfare-state institutions, governments must resist all
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proposals by which differences could be harmonized away through majority de-
cisions in the Council and the European Parliament. The point can be made more
generally: The European Union is not, and cannot soon become, a majoritarian
democracy (Lord 1998; Scharpf 1999; Greven 2000), and its institutional legiti-
macy cannot support policies that violate the permissive consensus of constituen-
cies in its member states.
By the same token, however, the problem-solving capacity of the European Union
must also remain limited. It was and is sufficient to create and regulate the larger
European market, but it is insufficient for Europeanizing those market-correcting
governing functions which, at the level of member states, are most vulnerable to
the pressures of economic competition. Hence member states must continue to
cope with these pressures in the mode of “mutual adjustment”. What that entails
for the survival of advanced European welfare states is the subject of ongoing
controversies in public debates and in academic analyses, which I cannot review
here (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000a, 2000b). There is no question that economic
globalization, and above all European economic integration and the Monetary
Union, have deprived national policy makers of many of the policy options which
they could and did employ in earlier decades to achieve and defend full em-
ployment and high levels of social protection. Moreover, intense competition in
international product markets and increased capital mobility are exerting down-
ward pressures on wages as well as on taxes and regulations that would increase
the unit costs of production or reduce post tax profits. Governments and unions
that ignore these international pressures will pay for it in terms of lower eco-
nomic growth and job losses. At the same time, national governments have lost
control over interest rates and exchange rates in the Monetary Union, public sec-
tor deficits are constrained by the rules of the Stability Pact and by the anticipated
response of international capital markets, and state subsidies are policed under
European competition law.
Constraints, however, are just that. They limit but do not rule out strategic
choices, and they do not determine outcomes. There are at least some European
countries – e.g., Denmark among the Scandinavian welfare states, the Nether-
lands among the Continental group and Portugal in the South – that have found
ways to achieve or maintain high international economic viability without aban-
doning their employment and welfare-state aspirations or resorting to beggar-
my-neighbor policies which – like devaluation – could only work if others do not
follow suit (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000a; Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes 2000). But
not all national welfare states have remained economically viable, and many of
them are struggling with disruptive political conflicts over tax cuts, welfare re-
trenchment and employment deregulation.
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Under these conditions, there is reason to ask if the European Union – which gen-
erated these problems for member states without being able to deal with them di-
rectly – might nevertheless play a positive role in facilitating successful coping
strategies at the national level. In my earlier work (Scharpf 1999: chapter 5), I
have discussed two such solutions – the formulation and enforcement of stan-
dards of “unfair regulatory and tax competition” by the Commission and the
Court, and what I have called “sub-European coordination.” In the meantime, the
first of these suggestions seems to have become a more realistic prospect with the
recent announcement of Commissioner Monti that he would henceforth examine
selective tax concessions under the rules applying to distortions of competition
through state subsidies.
The second suggestion might have a chance if the current Intergovernmental
Conference should in fact liberalize the provisions on “Closer Cooperation” in
Title VII of the Treaty of European Union. In that case, it might become possible
that groups of countries which have similar welfare-state institutions and are
facing similar problems could use the machinery of the European Union and the
services of the Commission to harmonize their social policies. Unfortunately,
however, the recent discussion has again raised the specter of an “avant-garde” of
member states moving ahead toward political integration and relegating all oth-
ers to second-class status. Given the decades of misunderstandings and appre-
hensions associated with proposals for “differentiated integration” in a “Europe
with variable geometry”, a “multi-speed Europe”, a “two-tier Europe”, a “Europe
à la carte”, a “Europe of concentric circles” or a “core Europe” (Ehlermann 1984;
1998; Giering 1997; Walker 1998; Búrca and Scott 2000), there is little hope at the
time of this writing (October 2000) that the extremely restrictive rules adopted at
the Amsterdam Summit would be significantly liberalized at the upcoming Nice
Summit.
But even if selective harmonization should be beyond reach, opportunities for co-
ordinating reform efforts could also be provided by the procedures of “open co-
ordination” which were introduced in the new “Employment” title of the EC-
Treaty at Amsterdam, and which the Lisbon Summit (23 and 24 March 2000) de-
cided to apply also in the field of social policy. In terms of the concepts used here,
open coordination could be located somewhere between the mode of “intergov-
ernmental negotiations” and the mode of “mutual adjustment”. It resembles
mutual adjustment insofar as governing competencies remain entirely at the na-
tional level and continue to be exercised by national governments that remain
fully accountable for their policy choices to their national electorates. There are, in
other words, no problems of a democratic deficit here. At the same time, how-
ever, national policy choices are not to be exercised in isolation. Acknowledging
that promoting employment is “a matter of common concern”, governments have
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accepted a commitment to “coordinate their action in this respect within the
Council” (Art. 126, II). For this purpose, the Council acting on a proposal of the
Commission will adopt annual guidelines for national action, member states will
submit annual reports on actions taken to implement these guidelines, and these
will be evaluated by a permanent high-level committee of national civil servants
and by the Commission, which may then propose specific recommendations to
the Council.
These rules provide for multilevel and recursive processes of joint problem analy-
ses and goal setting, self-commitment and self-evaluation, combined with com-
mon monitoring and central benchmarking capacities. Such arrangements appear
plausible if it is assumed that member states see themselves pursuing parallel,
rather than conflicting goals, but also prefer to remain free in defining and
adopting their own measures for reaching this goal – presumably because na-
tional conditions are so different or politically salient that uniform solutions
could not be effective or politically acceptable. Given that Article 129 explicitly
excludes the “harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States”
from the range of measures that the Council may adopt, the considerable efforts
required by the elaborate procedures of open coordination must then be justified
by the hope that monitoring, benchmarking and peer review could increase the
effectiveness of national employment and social policies (Ferrera, Hemerijck and
Rhodes 2000: chapter 4).
At a theoretical level, that is not implausible (Sabel 1995). The question is, how-
ever, whether these promises of “policy learning” can be fully realized under the
heterogeneous conditions shaping the employment and social-policy problems as
well as the policy options of EU member states.20 From what was said above, it
would follow that “open coordination” will be most effective if aspirations for
Europe-wide standards of performance are moderated by the recognition that
member states may legitimately differ not only in the policy instruments they
employ, but also in the goals they strive to attain and in the problems they need
to deal with. In that case, the potential gains from coordination and policy learn-
ing will be the greater, the more countries with similar institutions and policy
                                                  
20 It seems significant that the employment guidelines proposed by the Commission
and adopted by the Luxembourg Council for 1998 and the following years seem care-
fully designed to avoid all issues in which existing differences among the policy
legacies and institutional structures of member states would be highly salient, fo-
cusing instead on such institution-neutral goals as “improving employability”, “de-
veloping entrepreneurship”, “encouraging adaptability” and “strengthening policies
for equal opportunities” (Council 21–11–97). In Lisbon, the employment goals were
amended to include “lifelong learning” and “increasing employment in services”,
and open coordination was extended to also cover the goals of “modernizing social
protection” and “promoting social inclusion”.
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legacies will be encouraged to cooperate in focusing on their specific problems
and potential solutions to them.
At this time, it is too early to tell whether these efforts will remain at the level of
symbolic politics and public-relations or will have real effects on national poli-
cies.21 Nevertheless, “open coordination” does appear as a potentially valuable
addition to the set of institutionalized governing modes that are available in the
European polity. It is more flexible than either joint decisions or intergovern-
mental negotiations. In comparison to mutual adjustment, it could nevertheless
provide useful safeguards against unintended “races to the bottom” under con-
ditions of systems competition. If taken seriously by national governments, it
could become an important European response to the pressures on national wel-
fare states that were brought about by European economic integration.
To conclude: The European polity is a complex multi-level institutional configu-
ration which cannot be adequately represented by theoretical models that are
generally used in international relations or comparative politics. Worse yet, its
complexity also seems to defy all theoretical efforts based on holistic concepts.
The present article suggests that these difficulties could be overcome by a modu-
lar approach using a plurality of simpler concepts representing different modes
of multi-level interaction that are characteristic of subsets of European policy pro-
cesses. I have tried to show that these modes exist and that they have specific im-
plications for the institutional capacity and legitimacy of European governing
functions. My further claim (which was not developed here) is that the same con-
ceptual tools should also be useful for the analysis of subnational, national, trans-
national and other supranational policy-making institutions.
                                                  
21 Since no binding directives are to be adopted at the European level, actors who are in
fact in charge of national policy choices may fail to get actively involved in the coor-
dination exercises. In that case, the danger is that “National Action Plans” will
merely restate what governments are doing anyway, and that the learning effect of
deliberations at the European level may only educate international “liaison” officials
who lack effective power at home.
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